과학철학 17-1(2014) pp. 1-24

A Refutation of the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions*

Kai-Yuan Cheng†

There is a wide consensus that the conditional analysis of dispositions is a failure, due to the problems of finks (Martin 1994) and masks (Johnston 1992) or antidotes (Bird 1998). Against this trend, Choi (2003, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2012) has in recent years offered a vigorous and systematic defense of the conditional analysis of dispositions acclaimed as adequate. In this paper, I will argue that his defense of the conditional analysis strategy remains unsuccessful.

Choi (2011, 2012) has drawn recently a distinction between the context-dependent and context-independent stimulus conditions, and put it to effective use against some competing versions of conditional analyses. The result, as Choi claims, is the theoretical superiority over some competing conditional analyses, such as the Contextual Strategy and Manley and Wasserman's (2008) probabilistic account. In this paper, I will argue that considerations in support of Choi's own ordinary-conditions account (2008) aimed at solving the problems of finks and masks obstruct his attempt to draw the distinction in question. I diagnose where this problem originates, and show in what way Choi's conditional analysis is deficient.

* The completion of this paper is made possible by a funding support from the National Science Council of Taiwan (NSC 99-2411-H-194-012-MY3)

† Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition National Yang-Ming University, kcheng@ym.edu.tw

I will proceed as follows. First, I will describe the simple form of a conditional analysis of a disposition ascription and its basic problems. In sections II and III, I will review Choi's criticisms of the Contextual Strategy and show how he improves on it by drawing the context-dependent and context-independent distinction. In sections IV and V, I will argue that his ordinary-conditions account, when pieced together with the distinction in question, embodies some internal difficulties. Toward the end of the paper, I will discuss the prospects of the conditional analysis of dispositions.

【Key words】 Dispositions, Conditional, Finks, Ordinary Conditions, Context-Dependent Conditions, Context-Independent Conditions

Ⅰ. The Simple Conditional Analysis and Its Problems

A simple conditional analysis has the following form:

(SCA) N is disposed to M when C iff If N were in C, N would M,

where C and M refer to characteristic stimulus conditions and manifestations respectively. The *analysadum* of (SCA) is the so-called "canonical disposition", which has its M and C explicitly specified. A conventional disposition, in contrast, is denoted by a single word such as "fragility", "solubility", "inflammability" etc., which does not spell out its characteristic stimulus conditions and manifestations. Since our main concern is to analyze conventional dispositions, Lewis' (1997) two-step approach[1] is useful and

adopted widely for this purpose. It first analyzes a conventional disposition such as "fragility" into a canonical disposition, or an overtly dispositional locution ("a disposition to break when struck"), and then further analyzes it in terms of a counterfactual conditional ("If x were struck, x would break").

Despite its intuitive plausibility, the simple conditional analysis faces a variety of counterexamples. Suppose that a fragile glass were dropped one millimetre above the floor: it would not break when struck. Or the floor is paved with a thick layer of feathers, such that even if a fragile glass were dropped one metre or more above the floor, it would not break. A fragile glass may also be nicely protected by bubble-wraps such that it would not break dropped one metre above the floor without feathers[2]. There may be more imaginary cases where a fragile glass is protected by a sorcerer, who would remove the fragility of the glass and turn it into a sturdy object as soon as it were to be struck. The glass is clearly fragile, but it would not break if struck, thanks to the presence of the sorcerer[3]. In all these cases, the disposition ascription is obviously true, while its corresponding counterfactual conditional is false. (SCA) consequently fails as an adequate analysis of disposition ascriptions.

Ⅱ. The Contextual Strategy and Choi's Criticisms

There is an easy way to solve all the counterexamples mentioned above, in the eyes of a proponent of the contextual strategy. The

---

1) See Choi (2003).

2) This is a case known as a mask, see Johnston (1992).

3) This is a case known as fink, see Martin (1994), Lewis (1997).

key is to notice and exploit the context-sensitivity of a disposition ascription. When we ask if a TV set is fragile, the answer is not determinate, upon close examination. The context in which the question is raised is crucially relevant to how to answer it. Suppose the question is raised at a construction site where heavy blows are commonplace, the answer is that a TV set is fragile. In contrast, in the context of a home where soft blows to a TV set are commonplace, non-fragility is ascribed to a TV set. What this shows is that a conventional disposition term such as "fragility" is incomplete: it has a hidden variable whose semantic value has to be filled by some factor in a context that has to do with either the place where a disposition term is used or the person who uses it.[4)]

The semantic structure of a conventional disposition term such as "fragility" thus has the following form: *fragility + a phrase*, where the phrase denotes some contextual factor. It leads to the following refined analysis:

> *(SCA*) A TV set is fragile for heavy blows (e.g., at a construction site) iff it would break if stuck with heavy blows.*

A TV set would break if stuck in the presence of heavy blows. Hence, according to (SCA*), it is fragile in the presence of heavy blows. This fits nicely with our commonsense practice of fragility ascription. In the context of a home, the refined analysis goes as follows:

> *(SCA**) A TV set is fragile for soft blows (e.g., at home) iff it would break if struck with soft blows.*

A TV set would not break if struck by soft blows. Therefore,

---

4) See Hawthorn and Manley (2005).

according to (SCA**), it is not fragile. This again fits our intuition and practice of ascription well.

The same strategy can be adopted not only to exclude counterexamples to (SCA) such as the one millimetre case or the feather case, but also to handle those troublesome cases of finks or masks like that of a guarding sorcerer as follows[5]:

> *(SCAa) x is fragile in the absence of a sorcerer iff if it would break if struck in the absence of a sorcerer.*

(SCAa) dictates that, if something would break if struck in the absence of a sorcerer, then it is fragile. Also, if it would not break if struck in the absence of a sorcerer, then it is non-fragile. This is obviously a desirable result.

However, things are not so straightforward with (SCAb), where the context of ascribing fragility is the presence of a sorcerer:

> *(SCAb) x is fragile in the presence of a sorcerer iff x would break if struck in the presence of a sorcerer.*

In this case, since no object would break if struck in the presence of a sorcerer, x would count as non-fragile according to (SCAb). Choi (2011) contends that this result has two major drawbacks. One is that it goes against our intuition that x, supposing it has an infrastructure similar to a fragile object, remains fragile even given the presence of a sorcerer. Another is that the fragility term would be rendered practically useless, for both fragile and non-fragile objects alike would be ascribed non-fragility in the presence of a sorcerer. The unwanted consequence is that the fragility term cannot be used to sort things into fragile and non-fragile categories

---

[5] See e.g. Cross (2005), Mumford (1998).

and to guide our actions accordingly. These two criticisms of Choi against the contextual strategy-one based on our commonsense intuition, another based on the Principle of Utility for conventional disposition terms-are in my view well taken.

Ⅲ. The Context-Dependent and Context-Independent Distinction

Choi (2011) maintains that the defects of the contextual strategy are derived from its ignorance of the idea that the stimulus condition of being dropped onemillimetre above the floor has to be treated differently from that of being guarded by a sorcerer in a conditional analysis. The idea in question is quite intuitive. A fragile glass would indeed not break if struck when dropped one millimetre above the floor, which renders (SCA) false. To remedy the matter, a proponent of (SCA) would try to re-establish the logical equivalence of the two sides of the bi-conditional in (SCA) by simply modifying the stimulus condition in such a way that the object be dropped, say, one metre above the floor. The same method, however, does not seem applicable to the case of a sorcerer. With the presence of a guarding sorcerer, the ways in which we adjust the height of dropping an object seem irrelevant to whether the object would break or not if struck. No matter what height a fragile glass were dropped from onto the floor, the sorcerer with magical powers would instantly turn it into a sturdy object and it would not break as a result. This counterexample evidently needs a very different treatment from a proponent of the conditional analysis.

How, then, does Choi characterize this difference? Choi's main

claim is that the incomplete disposition ascription "x is fragile" has to be saturated in two distinct ways to derive its semantic value: one is through contextual contribution, and the other is independent of context. To illustrate this distinction, the semantic structure "D + a phrase" of a conventional disposition term D which the contextual strategy has helped uncovering is useful. Choi notes that there are two distinct ways in which the saturating phrase functions. One is that it denotes a stimulus condition that *qualifies* the characteristic stimulus condition. In the case of fragility, being dropped one metre above the ground plays such a qualifying role for the characteristic stimulus of being struck. Another is that the phrase denotes a stimulus condition that *serves* as the stimulus condition. For example, some objects are so fragile that they would break in the absence of any striking impact. It makes no sense in such a case to say that being struck is the stimulus condition for the fragility of those objects. What is more plausible to say is that being situated in the absence of a striking impact serves as, rather than qualifies, a stimulus condition for such objects to be fragile.

Choi takes this distinction to suggest that the stimulus conditions have to be classified into two types. One type is a group of conditions that are contributed by contexts and that qualify the characteristic stimulus condition. Being dropped one metre above the floor, or being dropped on the floor which is hard and clear of a thick layer of feathers, is among this group of conditions. When characterizing a disposition ascription in terms of a counterfactual conditional, an ideal set of characteristic stimulus conditions that figure in the antecedent of a conditional is a maximally specified set of conditions in the context. The other type of stimulus conditions is the group of conditions that makes reference to finks and masks, and a proponent of a conditional analysis has to

stipulate that they be absent. This part of the stimulus conditions is independent of any contextual contribution. The underlying idea of identifying this type of conditions is to respect the Principle of Utility for conventional disposition terms, as emphasized by Choi. Choi deems this principle as fundamental in our conceptions of using conventional disposition terms. Leaving out this context-independent part of stimulus conditions would lead to the consequence that, say, fragile objects are indistinguishable from non-fragile objects as was shown in the case of (SCAb), which is obviously detrimental.

Choi's position of making the context-dependent and context-independent distinction thus has a clear theoretical advantage over the contextual strategy. But this is not its only merit. Choi's distinction also appears more intuitive than the naïve view of Fara (2005) and others such as Manley and Wasserman (2008), who treat the characteristic stimulus condition for fragility as the simple event of being struck and all other conditions that prevent a fragile object from breaking upon being struck as masks or finks. As explained earlier, the condition of being nicely wrapped by bubble-wraps or being guarded by a sorcerer works very differently from that of being dropped one millimetre above the ground in causing a fragile object not to break when struck. This difference is well reflected in the distinction in question.

Ⅳ. The Notion of Ordinary Conditions

The schematic structure of Choi's sophisticated conditional analysis can now be sketched as follows:

(SCAs) x is fragile iff if x were in C, x would M,

where the stimulus condition C consists of two parts:

C1: characteristic stimulus condition, a maximally expanded set of conditions specified in a conversational context;
C2: absence condition of finks, masks, mimickers, etc.

Choi (2003, 2006) used to hold that the specification of C2 as such is sufficient to solve the problems of finks and masks, which are widely taken to be fatal counterexamples to (SCA). He later noticed (2008) that it embodies a defect of circularity, and proposed a more substantial account specifically to tackle this problem. In this sophisticated version of conditional analysis, the notion of ordinary conditions is critical. It can be stated as follows:

(CONV) x has a conventional disposition D at time t iff, if x were to undergo the D-stimulus at t under the ordinary conditions for D, then x would exhibit the D-manifestation.

Here the D-stimulus should be understood as C1, the characteristic stimulus condition which are maximally specified in a conversational context.

Ordinary conditions that figure in (CONV) for a particular disposition D are those extrinsic conditions *construed as ordinary by the possessors of the concept D*. For example, the extrinsic conditions for fragility are the conditions deemed as ordinary by 'people in the street', who 'know how to use the concept of fragility in sorting things or in drawing inferences, and we can therefore say that they possess the concept of fragility'[6]. One major virtue

[6] Choi (2008), p. 815.

of the ordinary-conditions analysis is that it solves the problems of finks and masks without the circularity problem. An extrinsic factor such as a guarding sorcerer is so bizarre that it would be excluded from the ordinary conditions by people. This way of specifying the stimulus conditions for a conventional disposition does not presuppose the notion of disposition under analysis. It is left for people who possess the concept of the disposition to decide what counts as an ordinary condition, and whether a disposition is in place in an object.

Choi gives some cases to support this proposal. Here is one of them. Suppose scientists discover that steel has an infrastructure similar to other fragile objects; it appears non-fragile simply because the air is prevalent with a special chemical Es, which prevents the manifestation of the steel's disposition of fragility if it were struck. In this case, steel may be ascribed fragility, and the presence of Es functions as a mask to the fragility of steel. Alternatively, steel may be ascribed non-fragility in (CONV). This is due to the possibility that the prevalent presence of Es is construed by ordinary people as an ordinary condition for the disposition of the steel, and the steel would not break if struck under those ordinary conditions. Choi maintains that the result delivered by (CONV) fits better with our commonsense intuition that steel is non-fragile after all in a daily life context, even if we are aware of the fact about the role played by Es as discovered by scientists.

The ordinary-conditions analysis is an intriguing proposal. However, one worrisome implication it has is that almost all conventional dispositions, the paradigmatic disposition of fragility included, would turn out extrinsic. This implication is derived from the two theoretical claims in Choi's conditional analysis:

ordinary-conditions have to do with the nature of dispositionality because they deal with interfering factors like finks and masks, which have to be absent from the stimulus condition for a disposition, and ordinary users of conventional disposition terms are invoked in the task of specifying ordinary conditions. To see how these two claims lead to an extrinsic disposition thesis, consider the case of steel surrounded by Es prevalent in the air. According to Choi's analysis, because the prevalent presence of Es is construed by people as an ordinary condition for steel, steel is ascribed non-fragility. Since Es is a constitutive part of the disposition of steel and is extrinsic to steel, the non-fragility of steel turns out to be an extrinsic disposition.

This implication is much more radical than that of McKitrick (2003), who explicitly attempts to argue for the thesis that some dispositions are extrinsic. McKitrick's thesis is fairly modest, in that it is established through the giving of some compelling examples such as weight, visibility and vulnerability; fragility is clearly kept out of the list. Choi's conditional analysis thus has a consequence that goes against a basic intuitive conception of many ordinary people and philosophers that a paradigmatic disposition such as fragility is an intrinsic property of an object[7]. Besides, this extrinsic disposition view also appears to contradict what Choi (2003) endorses when he claims that Bird's (1998, 2000) case against (SCA) can be improved by drawing on the thesis of the intrinsic character of dispositions.

These controversial and, as some would say, obviously unwelcome consequences of the ordinary-conditions account justifiably calls for caution in accepting Choi's conditional analysis of dispositions. However, I do not wish to dwell upon this issue

7) See e.g. Lewis, (1997), Bird (1998).

here, for Choi may well bite the bullet, claim that all or almost all dispositions are extrinsic, and develop his theory further. What I aim to show below is that Choi's ordinary-conditions account embodies a serious internal problem, which emerges when combined with the context-dependent and context-independent distinction.

Ⅴ. What Is Wrong with Choi's Analysis

To uncover this hidden problem, we may begin by reconsidering the case of steel surrounded by the prevalent presence of Es. There are four ways of construing the matter:

A) Steel is fragile; the pervasive presence of Es is an inappropriate stimulus condition for steel.
B) Steel is non-fragile; the pervasive presence of Es is an appropriate stimulus condition for steel.
C) Steel is fragile; the pervasive presence of Es is a mask.
D) Steel is non-fragile; the pervasive presence of Es is not a mask, because it is construed as an ordinary condition by people on the street.

Choi's analysis adopts D), and rejects C) and A). However, the option B) seems left out in Choi's considerations. This is questionable, for the following reason.

The main motivation for Choi's opting for D), as said, is to respect the Principle of Utility for the use of conventional disposition terms on a daily basis. But this motivation by itself does not preclude B): B) also allows us to ascribe non-fragility to steel, given that it would not break if struck under the set of appropriate stimulus conditions that includes the pervasive presence

of Es. We may recap this omission in another way. To ascribe non-fragility to steel in accord with the Principle of Utility, there are two ways to go: 1) to regard Es as in C1 (context-dependent stimulus conditions); 2) to regard Es as in C2 (context-independent stimulus conditions). Choi opts for 2) without offering reasons for not choosing 1). The problem thus boils down to this: a principled way of classifying which stimulus condition falls under C1) and which falls under C2) is needed, but not provided.

A somewhat different case has been offered by Choi to support his ordinary-conditions account, and the problem it faces is similar. The case concerns the disposition of inflammability, which is typically ascribed by us to a match. Knowledge of the pervasive presence of O_2 and its causal relevance to combustion is available to most people on the street. Therefore, a choice between characterizing O_2 as in C1) and characterizing O_2 as in C2) is, or at least could be made, explicitly accessible to ordinary people. Choi consistently opts for option D), and completely ignores the B) option. If intuition is what Choi relies on in his choice of these options, option B) appears no less intuitive than D).

One major undesirable consequence of failing to provide a principled way of distinguishing between C1 and C2 is the voiding of Choi's promise (2011) to solve the Achilles' heel problem. The problem, raised by Manley and Wasserman (2008), can be best introduced by the paradigmatic disposition of fragility. A non-fragile object might break if struck at a certain angle with a certain force, because it has some "weak" spot on it. The weak point of the non-fragile object is responsible for the failure of (SCA) under certain circumstances. The Achilles' heel phenomenon may run in reverse: a fragile object might not break if struck at a particular angle with a particular force. Such a case also constitutes

a counterexample to (SCA).

A solution to this problem requires that such intricate stimulus conditions as involved in the Achilles' heel phenomena are explicitly specified and excluded in (SCA). This task is undoubtedly challenging for a proponent of (SCA). It is, however, an even more daunting challenge for Choi's ordinary-conditions account. This is because these stimulus conditions have to be ruled out by ordinary people, according to the ordinary-conditions account, and it is easy to see that it is beyond ordinary people's capacity to even come close to specifying those conditions clearly.

Choi's suggestion is to avert this problem by noting that the to be specified and excluded stimulus conditions in the Achilles' heel phenomena belong to the set of context-dependent conditions, and that Manley and Wasserman's proposal of invoking the notion of probability could be adopted to take care of this prickly business. The important point is, then, that the ordinary-conditions analysis, which lies at the core of Choi's position, does not get involved in the extremely demanding task of specifying the context-dependent stimulus conditions. As a result, his position is not threatened by the Achilles' heel problem.

My contention is that Choi's suggestion presupposes the existence of the distinction between context-dependent and context-independent stimulus conditions. But since he fails to offer us a systematic way of drawing such a distinction, his conditional analysis cannot escape from the challenge posed by the Achilles' heel problem.

Choi may contest that the distinction that is needed to avoid the Achilles' heel problem is easy to see and draw, and that the contrast between qualifying and serving-as stimulus conditions is helpful in this regard. As explained earlier, certain stimulus

conditions for fragility are of the type of qualifying the characteristic stimulus condition, namely, the simple event of striking. For instance, the height from which a fragile object is dropped belongs to this type of conditions. This condition describes the particular way in which a fragile object is struck, i.e., it is struck when dropped from a certain height. In contrast, certain stimulus conditions are of the type which serve as characteristic stimulus conditions, rather than those that qualify the event of striking. Being situated in an environment of extremely low temperature is one such example. Since the specification of the stimulus conditions in the Achilles' heel phenomenon obviously involves the way in which a fragile object is struck, e.g. the peculiar angle in which it hits the floor or the specific range of force it receives when struck etc., those conditions fall under the qualifying type of conditions, not under the serving-as type.

It is doubtful that this move would work. The reason is that what distinguishes between qualifying and serving-as stimulus conditions is not clear. Why is it that the factor that has to do with height and the factor that has to do with temperature are treated differently in the characterization of a stimulus condition? It seems that aside from appealing to our naïve intuition, nothing more substantial has been offered to explain how this distinction may be drawn.

It might be suggested that Choi avail himself of the distinction between the notion of the cause and that of background causal conditions. The basic idea is that the event of striking is the cause of the breaking of a fragile object, and a set of background causal conditions are those conditions that have to be in place in order for the breaking to occur. In this construal, the prevalence of oxygen or Es and the presence of a sorcerer can all be classified as

background causal conditions, in contrast to that of an actual event as the cause.

This way of drawing the distinction does not seem agreeable to Choi's position, however. For when Choi (2012) clarifies what a mask is, he maintains that a mask is an interfering factor that prevents, say, a fragile glass from breaking even when all of its characteristic stimulus conditions are met, which include not only the simple event of being struck, but also a maximally expanded set of background causal conditions specified in some conversational context. This way of characterizing a mask is at odds with identifying the single event of striking as the cause and the rest of all relevant inhibitory and auxiliary factors as background casual conditions. Putting this problem aside, it is also unclear how to draw the distinction between the cause and a background causal condition, and doubtful that a real distinction exists between the two[8]. Thus, the proposed alternative way of drawing the C1/C2 distinction is not a favourable option for Choi's position.

To drive our concern home, we should pause and think: where does the difficulty of offering a systematic way of distinguishing between C1 (context-dependent) and C2 (context-independent) conditions originate from? I venture to say that the difficulty is rooted in the very distinction itself, which is muddy and questionable in the first place. The distinction was introduced by Choi to put on a firm theoretical footing an intuitively appealing difference between a stimulus conditions such as being dropped one millimetre above the floor and that of being guarded by a sorcerer. And it is this theoretical move that leads us astray. Below is an argument to prove this point.

---

[8] See e.g., Lewis (1973), Hall (2004).

Imagine that Twin Earth is like Earth in every aspect except that Es is pervasively prevalent in the air on earth while absent on twin earth. Choi's ordinary-conditions account would deliver the following results. On the one hand, Marie, an inhabitant on Earth, would regard the prevalent presence of Es as ordinary conditions for the relevant dispositions of steel, and since under those conditions steel would not break if struck, steel is ascribed non-fragility. On the other hand, Marie*, an inhabitant on Twin Earth, would construe the absence of Es as ordinary conditions for steel, and ascribe fragility to steel accordingly, for steel would break if struck under those ordinary conditions. So far so good. Now suppose Marie travels from Earth to Twin Earth. How would she make a disposition ascription to steel there? To respect, either implicitly or explicitly, the Principle of Utility for the use of conventional disposition terms that is to guide action in one's life, Marie would surely do as Marie* does, which is to regard the absence of Es in the air as ordinary conditions for steel, and ascribe fragility to steel accordingly. What does this imaginary scenario show?

I take it to show the following. Depending on where a person is situated, the way in which ordinary conditions are regarded is correspondingly determined. As was shown in the case of Marie who travels from earth to twin earth, her construal of ordinary conditions is adjusted relative to the context. In this way of describing the matter, which seems most natural, ordinary-conditions are context-dependent. This, however, appears to contradict how ordinary-conditions are construed in Choi's account. In his account, ordinary conditions are construed as context-independent.

To make this contradiction more succinctly, we may put the

matter in a more specific way. Seen from a larger context, where a case like the Twin-Earth traveling is considered, a semantic analysis of the fragility term which invokes the notion of ordinary conditions is such that the semantic value of the term has to be saturated by contextual factors which are involved in the specification of those ordinary conditions. In this analysis, the semantic behavior of ordinary conditions would be similar to that of characteristic stimulus conditions for fragility as construed by the proponents of the contextual strategy and Choi alike. A characteristic stimulus condition, such as the height from which an object is dropped, has a semantic role, which is that it is invoked as a contextual factor to saturate the meaning of the fragility term. In this sense, ordinary conditions turn out to be on a par with characteristic stimulus conditions in the regard of being context-dependent. The context-dependent and context-independent distinction for stimulus conditions thus appears problematic.

A similar point can be made in a more realistic case. Suppose a housewife visited her husband at a construction site. How would she ascribe fragility to a TV set on the site? In this context, where heavy blows are commonplace, she would regard heavy blows as ordinary conditions for the relevant dispositions of a TV set. Fragility would be ascribed to a TV set accordingly, because under those ordinary conditions, a TV set would break if struck. Note that this way of describing the scenario is perfectly natural, but it contradicts with how Choi would describe the same scenario in the following two basic ways. First, the extrinsic factor of receiving heavy (or soft) blows for a TV set is, in my version, considered under the category of ordinary-conditions, rather than under the set of characteristic stimulus conditions as Choi's version has it. Second, ordinary conditions in my version turn out to be

context-dependent, in a way that is not fundamentally different from characteristic stimulus conditions. In Choi's version, by contrast, these two types of stimulus conditions are supposed to be substantially distinct. Given that my way of describing the scenario is no less natural than Choi's, I take these two disparities in the description of the same scenario to reveal that the context-dependent and context-independent distinction is questionable. It is no wonder that Choi has a difficulty in giving a systematic way of classifying stimulus conditions into C1 and C2 when he engages in relevant philosophical considerations.

For those who are sympathetic to Choi's conditional analysis, it may be contested as follows:

> I agree that Choi does not provide a precise criterion for distinguishing the two types of stimulus conditions: C1 (those that qualify characteristic stimulus conditions) and C2 (absence condition of finks and masks). Nonetheless, I am not sure why Choi needs to distinguish these two types in such as precise way. A proponent of a conditional analysis has to stipulate that bizarre cases such as finks and masks be absent. So Choi's account includes this condition, namely C2: absence conditions of finks, masks and mimickers. Clearly this condition is different from a stimulus condition that qualifies the characteristic stimulus condition such as being dropped one metre above the ground in the case of fragility. Thus, in addition to C1 (that is, a stimulus condition that qualifies the characteristic stimulus condition), Choi's conditional analysis needs a separate condition like C2. Again, the reason is just that a stimulus condition that qualifies the characteristic stimulus condition cannot specify all possible bizarre cases such as finks and masks. Perhaps Choi could argue that what he needs is just this intuitive distinction, and so the fact that Choi fails to provide a principled way of distinguishing these two types of stimulus conditions might not be a serious problem for his view, after all.[9)]

A defense of Choi's account as attempted above is faulted on two fronts. First, it is one thing to think that the C1/C2 distinction is intuitive, but another thing to claim that the distinction is a legitimate one that can be made on a solid ground. Choi himself appears to acknowledge that his account would be inadequate if it were to equate these two things. It is thus hard to see how retreating to a weaker position—i.e., insisting that the distinction in question is merely intuitive—can help Choi. Second, even if we granted the legitimacy of drawing the C1/C2 distinction on an intuitive ground, C2 would seem to remain highly problematic. As explained earlier, the notion of absence condition of finks and masks is evidently circular, and renders the analysis trivial. A notion like that can at best, as it seems to me, serve as an intermediary conceptual tool to be employed for further theoretical articulation. This is exactly what Choi does. Leaving that notion as it is in a conditional analysis is not a viable option.

If my diagnosis of what goes wrong in Choi's analysis makes some sense, at least three options seem open to us. Option one is to try harder at providing a plausible systematic way of distinguishing between C1 and C2. This option appears quite hopeless, for the context-dependent and context-independent distinction has been shown to be theoretically troublesome. Option two is to develop some alternative method that enables us to draw the distinction between characteristic stimulus conditions on the one hand and interfering factors that have to do with finks, masks, mimickers etc., on the other hand. This option is hard to recommend, because some of the proposals, such as the qualifying/serving-as and the cause/background-causal-conditions

9) I thank a referee for raising this helpful question.

distinctions have been shown to be either inadequate or to founder. Option three is to cast doubt on the plausibility of Choi's conditional analysis, given its internal difficulties. Moreover, Choi's analysis is presumably among some of the few and most vigorous attempts in the conditional approach to account for the semantics of disposition ascriptions. Given its difficulties, we may reasonably suspect the prospects of the conditional approach in general of giving an adequate semantic analysis for disposition ascriptions. I tend to find option three acceptable. The challenge is, then, to find an alternative, non-conditional analysis that is plausible. That will be a task left for another occasion.[10)]

10) I am indebted to stimulating discussions with Alexander Bird, Sungho Choi, and participants of my Graduate Seminar on Dispositions back in 2011 at the Institute of Philosophy of National Chung-Cheng University in Chia-Yi, Taiwan.

References

Bird, A. (1998), "Dispositions and Antidotes", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 48: pp. 227-34.

_____ (2000), "Further Antidotes: A Response to Gundersen", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 50: pp. 229-33.

Choi, S. (2003), "Improving Bird's Antidotes", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81: pp. 573-80.

_____ (2006), "The Simple vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions", *Synthese* 148: pp. 369-79.

_____ (2008), "Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals", *Mind* 117: pp. 795-841.

_____ (2011), "Finkish Dispositions and Contexualism", *The Monist* 94(1): pp. 102-20.

_____ (2012), "What Is a Dispositional Maser?", *Mind* 120(480): pp. 1159-71.

Cross, T. (2005), "What Is a Disposition?", *Synthese* 144: pp. 321-41.

Fara, M. (2005), "Dispositions and Habituals", *Noûs* 39: pp. 43-82.

Hall, N. (2004), "Two Concepts of Causation", in *Causation and Counterfactuals,* edited by J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul, The MIT Press.

Hawthorne, J. and Manley, D. (2005), "Critical Study of Stephen Mumford's *Dispositions*", *Noûs* 39: pp. 179-95.

Johnston, M. (1992), "How to Speak of the Colors", *Philosophical Studies* 68: pp. 221-63.

Lewis, D. (1973), "Causation", *Journal of Philosophy* 70: pp. 556-67.

_____ (1997), "Finkish Dispositions", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 47: pp. 143-58.

Manley, D. and Wasserman, R. (2008), "On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals", *Mind* 117: pp. 59-84.

Martin, C. B. (1994), "Dispositions and Conditionals", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 44: pp. 1-8.

McKitrick, J. (2003), "A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81: pp. 155-74.

Mumford, S. (1998), *Dispositions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Date of first draft	2013. 12. 01
Date of review completed	2014. 02. 15
Date of approval decided	2014. 02. 18

성향에 대한 조건문적 분석에 대한 반박

카이 우안 쳉

성향에 대한 조건문적 분석은 finks, masks, antidotes와 관련된 문제로 실패했다는 것이 일반적 견해이다. 이런 흐름에 반대하여 최성호 (2003, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2012)는 성향에 대한 조건적 분석에 대한 엄밀하고 체계적인 옹호를 제시해 왔다. 나는 이 논문에서 최성호의 옹호가 성공적이지 못하다는 점을 주장한다.

최성호 (2011, 2012)는 맥락 의존적 자극 조건과 맥락 독립적 자극 조건을 구분하고 그 구분을 조건문적 분석의 경쟁 버전들에 대립하여 효율적으로 이용하고 있다. 이 접근은 맥락적 전략과 확률적 설명(Manley and Wasserman 2008)과 같은 경쟁하는 조건문적 분석들에 비해 우월한 설명을 제공한다. 나는 finks 문제와 masks 문제를 해결하려는 최성호의 일상적 조건 설명은 그 구분을 이끌어내는 데 방해가 된다는 점을 주장할 것이다. 나는 문제가 발생하는 부분을 진단하고 최성호의 분석의 결함을 보일 것이다.

이 글의 순서는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 나는 성향 귀속에 대한 조건문적 분석의 단순한 형태를 기술하고 그것의 기본 문제들을 지적한다. 2절과 3절에서 나는 맥락 전략에 대한 최성호의 비판을 검토하고 맥락 의존과 맥락 독립 구분을 이끌어냄으로써 자신의 비판을 어떻게 향상시키는지를 보인다. 4절과 5절에서 나는 그의 일상적 조건 설명은 문제의 구분과 같이 고려될 경우 내적 문제들을 안고 있다는 점을 주장한다. 마지막으로 나는 성향에 대한 조건문적 분석의 전망을 논의한다.

주요어: 성향, 성향적, finks, 일상적 조건, 맥락 의존적 조건, 맥락 독립적 조건